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Suzanna and t h e  Ninth Amendment 
Raoul Berger* 
Suzanna Sherry pronounces that "the preliminary debate 
over the meaning of the ninth amendment is essentially 
over. . . . [Alll but one contributor [to a recent symposium] 
agreed that the ninth amendment does protect judicially 
enforceable unenumerated rights."' A count of noses cannot 
settle so important an issue, for as Sidney Hook observed, 
"CW]hat makes a thing true is not who says it, but the evidence 
for it? Sherry is long on assertion but short on facts. A fellow 
symposiast, Andrzej Rapaczynski, wrote that "for every 
interpretation that sees [the Ninth Amendment] as support for 
judicial activism there is another, respectable one, that does 
not.''3 Sherry finds only one dissenter in the symposium, 
Michael McComell,4 but cheek by jowl with her own contribu- 
tion there is my dissenting a r t i~ le .~  Then too, Rapaczynski 
regards the amendment as of "very problematic" meaningf to  
another symposiast, Sanford Levinson, it is a "mystery."' Last 
* A.B. University of Cincinnati 1932; J.D., Northwestern University 1935; 
LLM., Harvard University 1938. Honorary degrees from University of C inc i~a t i ,  
University of Michigan, and Northwestern University. 
1. Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment: Righting an Unwritten 
Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1001 (1988), reprinted in 2 THE RIGHTS 
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 283, 283 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993) [hereinafter 
RIGHTS RETAINED]. 
2. SIDNEY HOOK, PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY 121 (1980). 
3. Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten 
Constitution: The Problems of Constitutional Interpretation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
177 (1988) reprinted in 2 R I G ~ S  RETAINED, supm note 1, at  163, 163. 
4. Sherry, supra note 1, at  283. 
5. Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment: The Beckanin. Mirage, 42 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 951 (1990), reprinted in 2 RIGIFTS RETAINED, supra note 1, at  297. 
6. Rapaczynski, supra note 3, at  172 11.20. 
7. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 
64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131, 143 (1988). 
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but not least, Robert Bork regards it as an "ink blot." So 
Sherry's exultation is premature. 
Before moving to  her argument in chief, I would protest 
against labelling all who differ with her and her fellows as the 
"New Right."' Implicit in that label is the self-righteous 
assumption that activists alone are without political goals, 
although Paul Brest, a leading activist, pleaded with Academe 
"simply to  acknowledge that most of ou r  writings are not 
political theory but advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs 
ultimately designed to persuade the Court to adopt our various 
notions of the public good."1° Speaking for myself, I am a 
lifelong liberal, and have ever endeavored to  exclude my socio- 
political aspirations from evaluation of constitutional verities, 
often criticizing the Court for departing from the Constitution, 
although the decisions enlisted my sympathies on the merits. 
Unless we are to  view the Framers as "dimwitted," Sherry 
urges, we must believe that they did not distinguish between 
"the written, judicially enforceable Constitution and unwritten 
natural law."" They spoke, she reasons, of the "Constitution 
and unwritten natural law in the same breath . . . without 
distinguishing between the two, strongly suggest[ing] that they 
thought of unwritten rights as analogous" to the written "legal 
rights" of the Constitution. "To attribute to them any other 
conclusion strains credulity."12 The "dimwitted" Chief Justice 
Marshall made this very distinction: "[tlhe powers of the 
legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may 
not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. . . . 
[T]o what purpose is that limitation committed to  writing, if 
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to 
be restrained?"13 What is resort to natural law but the very 
attempt to  pass the limits "by those intended to  be restrained?" 
8. Nomination of Robert Bork to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1987), reprinted in part in 2 RIGI-~~S  RETAINED, supm note 1, 
at 427, 441. 
9. Sherry, supra note 1, at 283. 
10. Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential 
Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 
(198 1). 
11. Sherry, supra note 1, at 284-85. 
12. Id. at 285. 
13. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). The Framers, 
Marshall added, "contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of 
courts, as well as of the legislature." Id. at 180. 
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Not for nothing did Article VI clause 2 declare that "This 
Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land."14 In 
place of "higher law" the Constitution itself was to be the 
"superior, paramount law."15 That which is para- 
mountisupremely ~ontrolling'~-cannot be superseded by 
natural law. "Law," Robert Cover observed, "as a sovereign act 
clearly mandated the subordination of natural law to  
 constitution^."'^ Suppose, however, that the Constitution 
makes no provision for a particular situation, or makes one of 
doubtful import, what then? Let Madison answer: Wad the 
power of making treaties, for example, been omitted, however 
necessary it might have been, the defect could only have been 
lamented, or supplied by an amendment of the Consti- 
t~tion."'~ Mark that by necessary implication Madison pre- 
cluded resort to natural law. 
Against Sherry's: the Framers spoke of the Constitution 
and natural law "in the same breath"19 let me oppose some 
facts. A pioneer student of natural law in America, Benjamin 
Wright, wrote of the Founding, "[tlhere were few appeals to the 
law of nature . . . with rare exceptions they simply found it 
unnecessary to their purposes."20 Consider Edmund 
Randolph's common-sensical observation in the Convention: 
"rhis . . . display of theory, howsoever proper in the first form- 
ation of state governments, is unfit here; since we are not 
working on the natural rights of men not yet gathered into 
society, but upon those rights, modified by society, and 
interwoven with what we call the rights of  state^.'^' Justice 
McLean put the matter shortly in Miller u. McQuerry, a 
fugitive slave case: "It is for the people . . . in making 
constitutions, and in the enactment of laws, to consider the 
laws of nature. . . . This is a field which judges can not 
explore."22 Tacitly, wrote Louis Henkin, "[fJramers of 
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
15. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
16. FUNK & WAGNALLS, DESK STANDARD ICTIONARY (1946). 
17. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 34 (1975). 
18. 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1950 (1834). 
19. Sherry, supra note 1, at 285. 
20. BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATION OF NATURAL LAW 125 
(1931). No reference to "natural law" or the Yaw of nature" appears in the index 
of 4 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS]. 
21. 2 RECORDS, supra note 20, at 137 (editor's notes omitted). 
22. 17 F. Cas. 335, 339 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9583). 
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constitutions and bills of rights distinguished between rights 
that preexisted society and civil rights enjoyed in society."23 
To illustrate the early climate of opinion, Sherry summons 
state judges who "used unwritten law to  invalidate legislative 
 action^.^ For example, Judge Burke of South Carolina stated 
that "trial by jury is a common law right . . . originating in 
time imrnem~rial."~~ "Time immemorial" is judicial fantasy. 
Justice Cardozo considered that trial by jury is not '"so rooted 
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to  be ranked 
as f~ndamental.""~ But I shall waste no time distinguishing 
state cases and shall consider instead some basic facts that 
render them inapposite. First, there is the distinction pointed 
out by James Wilson between the limited powers delegated to  
the federal government and the plenary powers enjoyed by the 
states, unless prohibited." Second, state constitutions, if 
memory serves me, had no supremacy clause-their 
constitutions were not declared to  be "the supreme law." A 
constitution which is the supreme, paramount law leaves no 
room for a judge to  wander outside its confines. 
There are telling items as to the federal practice of which 
Sherry makes no mention. She ignores the famous split 
between Justices Chase and Iredell in Calder v. Bull. Chase's 
mention of supra-constitutional principles was immediately 
rebutted by Iredell: "[Tlhe Court cannot pronounce [a statute] 
to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to 
the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice 
are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest 
men have differed upon the subject."28 The Framers were well 
aware that laws might offend against natural law and still 
23. LOUIS HENKIN, DIGNITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGEFTS 213-14 (1992). "The 
underlying assumptionn of the Virginia Constitution of 1776 "is that the rights of 
the individual have nothing to fear from majority rule exercised through legislative 
assemblies . . . ." Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American 
Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 365, 403-04 (1928). 
24. Sherry, supra note 1, at 285. 
25. Id. at 289 (quoting Zylstra v. Corporation of Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 
382, 395 (1794)). 
26. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). The slow development of trial by jury is 
traced by MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 204-18 
(1936). 
27. 2 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 436 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., reprint ed., Ayer Company 1987) (1888); Levinson, supra note 
7, at 140. 
28. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798). 
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require enforcement. In the Convention Wilson said, "Laws 
may be unjust, . . . may be destructive; and yet not be so 
unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give 
them effect.'ng George Mason spoke to the same effect?' In 
what may be regarded as a recantation sub silentio, Chase 
rejected a federal common law of crimes in United States o. 
Worrall saying, "the constitution of the Union is the source of 
all the jurisdiction of the national government; so that the 
departments of the government can never assume any power, 
that is not expressly granted by that instr~ment."~' Then 
there is Justice Story's observation respecting the powers of 
equity: if an English court possessed the "unbounded 
jurisdiction . . . arising from natural law and justice" ascribed 
to it, "it would be the most gigantic in its sway, and the most 
formidable instrument of arbitrary power, that could well be 
devised."32 Lastly, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged in 
29. 2 RECORDS, supra note 20, at 73. 
30. Id. at 78. Such remarks are dismissed by Sherry as "a few scattered 
statements in the Federal Convention," Sherry, supra note 1, at  284, which 
presumably represented the Convention's sentiments, for it voted against inclusion 
of the Justices in exercise of the presidential veto. She prefers Thomas Grey's 
attribution to the Framers of a "belief in judicially enforceable natural rights." Id. 
Grey's article deals with pre-1787 "revolutionary thought." Thomas C. Grey, Origins 
of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary 
Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978). I t  is studded with pre-independence 
utterances, when "higher law" served to justify colonial resistance to Parliament's 
misrule. After independence, however, the Founders' distrust of judicial hegemony 
reemerged, as is reflected in Hamilton's assurance in Federalist No. 78 that of the 
three branches the judiciary is "next to nothing." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at  504 
(Alexander Hamilton)(Sherman F. Mittel ed., sesquicentennial ed. 1937) (quoting 
MONTESQUIEU, 1 SPIRIT OF LAWS 186 (ad.)). In 1791 Justice James Wilson 
explained that judges had been derived from a "foreign source . . . [and] were 
directed to foreign purposes. Need we be surprised, that they were objects of 
aversion and distrust?" JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF 
JAMES WILSON 69, 292 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., Belknap Press 1967) (1804). He 
felt constrained to exhort his fellow citizens that it was time to "chastise our 
prejudices." Id. at 293. 
More cautious than Sherry, Grey acknowledges that the effect of a "written 
constitution" on "the idea that judicially ascertainable fundamental law could itself 
have constitutional status remains to be carefully analyzed," and that it iemains 
to be shown" that "noninterpretive judicial review was consistent" with "popular 
sovereignty." Grey, supra, at 893. Haines noted that "it is customary to assert that 
the doctrine of natural rights and natural law has had little acceptance as a basis 
for judicial decisions in the public law of the United States." Charles G. Haines, 
The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial Decisions, 25 YALE L.J. 617, 625 
(1916). 
31. 28 F. Cas. 774, 779 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) @To. 16,766) (emphasis added). 
32. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE C O N S T ~ O N  OF THE UNITED 
STATES 8 9 (5th ed. 1905). 
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The Antelope that slavery was abhorrent to  natural law, but 
held that long usage had made it legal under the Yaw of 
 nation^."^^ Whatever the views of state judges, they must 
yield to the course of the federal law. 
In one of her wildest flights of fancy Sherry concludes that 
to  eschew "the temptation t o  view judging as a mechanical act," 
the Framers fashioned the Ninth Amendment as "their 
safeguard,"-this in a "century in which judges were expected 
merely to discover the law,"34 not to make it. Vainly will the 
reader search the history of the Bill of Rights for evidence that 
the Ninth Amendment was to  "safeguard" judicial freewheeling. 
To the contrary, the Bill of Rights was meant to "limit," not t o  
enlarge, federal powers.35 The fact is that judges were suspect, 
unlikely repositories of unbridled dis~retion.~~ Sherry gives 
scant weight to  the fact that, as the Declaration of 
Independence proclaims, ours is a government by consent of 
the governed:' and prefers to test the legitimacy of the 
Constitution by whether it is moral and just? She repels the 
notion that we "are not good enough to make our own moral 
decisions," to make "moral choices."3g Indubitably we are free 
to make our own "moral choices," but it does not follow that 
they must be made for us by unelected, virtually irremovable 
judges rather than by the people themselves through their 
33. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120-22 (1825); see also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 
410, 425-26 (1979); Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 413 (1829). 
34. Sherry, supra note 1, at 296. 
35. Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL . REV. 1, 8 (1980). 
36. See infia text accompanying notes 56-59. 
37. "The people," said Justice James Iredell, one of the ablest Founders, "have 
chosen to be governed under such and such principles. They have not chosen to be 
governed or promised to submit upon any other . . . ." James Iredell, Address to 
the Public, in 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 146 (GriffXh J. 
McRee ed., Peter Smith (1949)) (1857). 
Roger Sherman stated, "The greatest security that a people can have . . . is 
that no laws can be made to bind them . . . without their consent by 
representatives of their own chusing." Herbert J. Storing, The "Other" Federalist 
Papers: A Preliminary Sketch, 6 POL. SCI. REVIEWER 215, 227 (1976). 
38. Sherry, supra note 1, at  290. The activist search for the authority or 
legitimacy of the Constitution derives no sustenance from the Supreme Court. The 
Justices are creatures of the Constitution and cannot very well question the source 
from which they derive their own authority. Certainly the constant appeals to the 
Constitution by the people and the bar testify to their belief in its legitimacy. Paul 
Brest stated that "the written Constitution lies at the core of the American 'civil 
religion.'" Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 
B.U. L. REV. 204, 234 (1980) (quoting Sanford Levinson, "The Constitution" in 
Amercian Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123). 
39. Sherry, supra note 1, at 293. 
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elected representatives or by amendment as Article V 
provides.40 
Sherry erroneously asserts that no "New Right theorist" 
would deny that "unelected judges should have some obligation 
to oversee the community's moral choices."41 Wrong again. Not 
a scintilla of evidence remotely suggests that the Framers and 
Ratifiers contemplated that judges would serve as arbiters of 
morals. They plainly rejected the participation of judges on 
issues of and they would have been astonished by the 
claim that judges have special competence in the field of 
morals.43 
Morals are not cawed in stone; many view morals as  
products of time and place. An activist, Larry Simon, observed 
that "moral theory today is a 'conceptual melange'"~4 another 
activist, Michael Perry, considers that "[p]olitical-moral 
philosophy, after all, is in a state of serious disarray."45 On 
such issues as abortion and death penalties, for instance, the 
nation is split. A "radical division of opinion," philosopher 
Thomas Nagel observed, indicates that there is a "case of basic 
moral ~ncer ta in ty . '~~ "[Nlothing but confusion of thought," 
40. In McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892), the Court rejected the 
notion that the Constitution may be "amended by judicial decision without action 
by the designated organs in the mode by which alone amendments can be made." 
41. Sherry, supra note 1, at 293. 
42. Nathaniel Gorham said that judges "are not to be presumed to possess 
any peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of public measures." 2 RECORDS, supra 
note 20, at 73. Elbridge Gerry declared that "[ilt was quite foreign from the nature 
of ye. office to make them judges of the policy of public measures." 1 Id. at 97-98. 
In Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 260 (1796), Justice Iredell stated: "These 
are considerations of policy . . . certainly entirely incompetent to the examination 
and decision of a Court of Justice." Earlier, Judge Henry spoke to the same effect 
in Virginia: "The judiciary . . . could never be designed to determine upon the 
equity, necessity, or usefulness of a law; that would amount to an express 
interfering with the legislative branch." Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 
47 (1793). Kamper was a landmark case for judicial review. 
43. Jefferson stated, "I cannot give up my guidance to the magistrates, 
bec[ausel he knows no more of the way to heaven than I do, [and] is less 
concerned to direct me right than I am to go right." SAUL K. PADOVER, JEFFERSON 
44 (Mentor ed. 1952) (first alteration in original). 
44. Larry Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A 
Preface to a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 619 
(1985) (quoting ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, AFI%R VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL 
THEORY 234 (1981)). 
45. Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory 
of Constitutional "Interpretation", 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 592-93 (1985) (citing 
MAcINTYRE, supra note 44, at 6-10). 
46. Thomas Nagel, l%e Supreme Court and Political Philosophy, 56 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 519, 524 (1981). Levinson noted that insistence on a "linkage between law 
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Justice Holmes considered, "can result from assuming that the 
rights of man in a moral sense are equally rights in the sense 
of the Constitution and the law."47 The uncertainty that 
bedevils "morals" likewise beclouds "justice." Although Perry 
would make the law more sensitive t o  contemporary social 
problems, he notes that "[mlany different and competing con- 
ceptions of justice clamor for our attention. . . . Each conception 
confronts serious problems. . . ." He remarks that "various 
considerations of self-interest have powerfully distorted the 
visions and pursuit of justice."48 More important, the Framers 
were aware that unjust laws might be constit~tional.~~ 
Sherry's involuted rhetoric obscures rather than 
enlightens. Consider her "meaning does not inhere in 
documents, but is created by an interaction between a 
document and its readers?' an obfuscatory version of the 
current fad in literary circles that a reader is free to  read into a 
literary work whatever he chooses. That may be well enough 
for a novel, but the limitations and mandates of a Constitution 
would be set at naught were every man free to read it after his 
own heart. Commonly "meaning" is defined as that which is 
intended. When, additionally, a writer explains what he means, 
the reader may not insist in the teeth of that explanation that 
his own, quite different "meaning" is to prevail. Concretely, 
when a writer explains that by a stringed instrument he means 
a four-stringed instrument, e.g., a violin, the reader may not 
maintain that the writer means a multi-stringed harp. John 
and moral norms . . . assume[s] a moral consensus which no longer exists." 
Sanford Levinson, The Specious Morality of the Law, HARPER'S, May 1977, at 35, 
99. 
47. OLIVER W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
167, 171-72 (1920). Sherry finds such "positivist" views "dispiriting" and opts for 
the right to make "our own moral decisions." Sherry, supm note 1, at 293. On the 
other hand, David Richards, a perfervid activist, looks askance at  'judicial 
divination about conventional morality." David A.J. Richards, Constitutional 
Interpretation, History, and the Death Penalty: A Book Review, 71 CAL. L. REV. 
1372, 1397 (1983) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES (1982)). 
48. Perry, supra note 45, at 577, 592-93. 
49. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30. Justice Holmes said to his 
brethren many times, "I hate justice, which means that I know if a man begins to 
talk about that, for one reason or another he is shirking thinking in legal terms." 
THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 435 (Max Lerner ed., 1943). Professor 
Felix Frankf!urter wrote that justice is not the %st[] of constitutionality." WALLACE 
MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLlCT IN THE COURT 54 (2d 
ed. 1966). 
50. Sherry, supra note 1, at 295. 
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Selden, a preeminent seventeenth century scholar, stated, "[A] 
Man's Writing has but one true sense, which is that which the 
Author meant when he writ it"?' that was likewise the view 
of Hobbes and Locke." Such sturdy common sense is to  be 
preferred to Sherry's "meaning is created by interaction 
between a document and its readers," a fancy way of saying 
that a judge is free to substitute whatever meaning he 
chooses" for the "meaning" intended by the draftsmen. In her 
infatuation with judicial law-makinp Sherry overlooks that 
the Founders had a "profound fear of judicial independence and 
discreti~n,"~~ that they were influenced by the English 
Puritans' fear that "the law's meaning could be twisted by 
means of judicial ~onstruction,"~~ and that they feared the 
51. JOHN SELDEN, Bible, Scripture, in THE TABLE-TALK OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 
7, 11 (London, William Pickering 1847). 
52. Hobbes stated that the judge is to be guided by "the fmall causes, for 
which the Law was made; the knowledge of which finall causes is in the 
Legislator." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN *143. Locke wrote, 
When a man speaks to another, it is . . . [to] make known his ideas to 
the hearer. That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the 
speaker . . . this is certain, their signification, in his use of them is 
limited to his ideas, and they can be signs of nothing else. 
1 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 204, 206 
(Raymond Wilborn ed., 1987). 
53. "Noninterpretivists devise their theories so that courts can do more." Lino 
A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 ;STAN. L. REV. 1019, 
1032 n.80 (1992). 
54. It was not ever thus; see Henry Steele Commager's scathing review of the 
pre-New Deal Court. Henry S. Commager, Judicial Review and Democracy, 19 VA. 
Q. REV. 417, 428 (1943). Shortly before his appointment to the Court, Solicitor 
General Robert H. Jackson wrote, "[tlime has proved that [the Court's] judgment 
was wrong on the most outstanding issues upon which it has chosen to challenge 
the popular branches." ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY 37 (1941). 
55. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 
at  298, 304 (1969). 
56. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885, 892 (1985). 
Sherry is persuaded that the search "for rules that truly constrain judges, is 
bound to fail." Sherry, supra note 1, at 289. Minimally, that is the ideal toward 
which we must strive; meanwhile some measure of constraint is better than none. 
Story and Kent, who were closer to the Founders, had greater faith in rules. Story 
asked, "are the rules of common law to furnish the proper guide, or is every court 
and department to give any interpretation according to  its own arbitrary will? 
1 STORY, supm note 32, 8 166 n.2. The Founders preferred rules, in Kent's words, 
to "a dangerous discretion . . . to roam at large in the trackless field of [the 
judges'] own imaginations." 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 373 
(Boston, Little Brown & Co. 9th ed. 1858). For this they had the authority of 
Hamilton: "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that 
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"judges' imposition of their personal views?' very much as 
the anti-activists do today. Even after the creation of an 
"independent" judiciary, Justice James Wilson, a leading 
architect of the Constitution, felt constrained in 1791 to 
admonish his fellow Americans no longer to regard judges as 
"objects of aversion and distrust."58 Against this background 
S h e w s  brief for a freewheeling judiciary is surreal. Judge 
Richard Posner more realistically cautioned that "as the courts 
move deeper into subjects on which there is no ethical 
consensus, judicial activism . . . becomes ever more partisan 
and parochial, lawless, and finally reckless."5g 
The English legal tradition has ever preferred the par- 
ticular to  the sweeping generalization. Goethe envied this 
English predilection, preferring "the common sense point of 
view" to that of philosophy; he criticized the German bent for 
"philosophic spe~ulation."~~ William James likewise was 
"impatient with the awful abstract rigmarole in which our 
philosophers obscure the truth.'*' Current academicians tend 
to swaddle the simplest proposition in murky rhetoric,B2 
suggesting either muddy thinking or an intention to veil the 
truth. 
Implicit in Sherry's fancy theorizing and that of her fellows 
is a confession of failure to obtain from the people the 
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents." THE FEDERALIST No. 
78, supra note 30, at 510. 
57. Powell, supra note 56, at 891. 
58. WILSON, supra note 30, at 292-93. 
59. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 215 
(1985). 
60. J.P. ECKERMAN, CONVERSATIONS OF GOm- 293, 307, 464 (1933). 
61. JACQUES BARZUN, A STROLL WH WILLIAM JAMES 137 (1983); see also id. 
at 125, 133. 
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